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CLINTON AND THE PROCESS TO PASS NAFTA: MAKING SAUSAGE
President George Bush hurried the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
negotiations to a conclusion in 1992 in time for the Republican National Convention. Although NAFTA still required congressional approval, the Bush campaign believed the ensuing debate would divide the Democratic Party and make candidate Bill Clinton appear weak and vacillating on trade issues. NAFTA was a divisive issue that unleashed nationalistic, xenophobic, and demagogic currents throughout the United States. One year later, however, the newly elected Clinton Administration embraced NAFTA and deftly crafted a triumphant political strategy that ensured the passage of the free trade initiative through the U.S. Congress against overwhelming
odds. An examination of how Clinton congealed a bipartisan alliance and influenced the political process--akin to making sausage--to secure ratification of NAFTA is provided.
Background
Hundreds of politicians and political organizations took a stand on NAFTA. The idea for a NAFTA originated in June 1990 between George Bush, president of the United States, and
Carlos Salinas, president of Mexico. Later, Canada joined the process, and in June 1991, formal negotiations on a NAFTA were initiated. 1 The NAFTA document itself was 1.5 inches thick, consisted of more than one thousand pages of text organized into twenty-two chapters, with numerous annexes, plus supplemental agreements on the environment and labor. Negotiated in the midst of a recession, the agreement touched off a major debate in the United States, where fears of a flood of imported goods produced with low-cost labor generated widespread attacks from labor organizations, environmentalists, and import-sensitive industries. groups. In October 1992, Bill Clinton announced he was supporting NAFTA. Clinton said that the agreement Bush had negotiated had problems, but they could be fixed without starting over.
If elected, however, he would not sign a bill implementing NAFTA unless it included additional agreements that protected labor and the environment. 4 The most independent and outspoken critic of NAFTA was Ross Perot. During the 1992 election, the Texas billionaire appeared suddenly and rose rapidly in the polls. Perot was very adept at diagnosing and articulating the nation's ills. Paradoxically, as a businessman, Perot stood to benefit from NAFTA. However, his arguments lacked the sophistication and depth of research that the opponents had from think tanks and advocacy groups linked to labor and the Democratic Party. 5 Nonetheless, he used his substantial resources to buy television adds to present a distinctly negative image of Mexico and the future of the U.S. under NAFTA--to include a 30 minute infomercial aired on CNN. Perot also published an anti-NAFTA book that tapped into a prevalent concern about foreign influence in US politics, economic insecurity, and U.S. nationalism. Although Perot did not win a single electoral vote in the presidential campaign, he gained 19 percent of the popular vote--a strong anti-NAFTA force to be reckoned with after the election. 
Interest Groups
Clinton screwed us and we won't forget it. Organized labor was the main interest group opposed to NAFTA. The AFL-CIO argued that NAFTA would result in hundreds of U.S. companies relocating to Mexico to take advantage of cheap labor, which would result in a loss of jobs in the U.S. Organized labor believed that many of the jobs lost to NAFTA would be unionized jobs while non-unionized workers would migrate northward. 10 Nonetheless, organized labor was in a difficult position. Its membership had been declining for many years and its public image was not very good. Furthermore, an aggressive position on NAFTA could drive U.S. Hispanic workers away from the union. The AFL-CIO, however, still had some "veto power" on many issues in Washington and several politicians were unwilling to stake out positions unfavorable to organized labor. Politicians were aware that the AFL-CIO provided major voting blocks and financial support in election campaigns, and its leadership could target a recalcitrant member of Congress with sufficient numbers of hostile voters to cause an election defeat.
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Likewise, the environmental interest groups were strongly against NAFTA and carried considerable political clout. Fearing Mexico would become a haven for industrial polluters, the environmental groups launched the opening salvo of the "stop-NAFTA" process. Three environmental groups--Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club--brought a case against NAFTA on environmental grounds to a U.S. District Court. In June 1993, the judge ruled that the Clinton Administration would have to submit an environmental impact statement before NAFTA could be submitted to Congress which would, in effect, kill the treaty.
Clinton was furious and his Administration filed an appeal. The suit was dismissed in September
1993
. The concessions Kantor made to organized labor were far weaker than concessions made to environmentalists. The USTR knew that labor interests in the U.S. had less leverage in the domestic-level bargain. Although a strong political force, labor lost their ability to influence the action--they would not support any NAFTA proposal. 22 However, Kantor needed mainstream environmentalists, like Senator Max Baucus, to support NAFTA. To show his constituents that he advocated the environmentalist agenda, Baucus demanded that NAFTA include trade sanctions on Mexico if they violated the environmental provisions. Kantor agreed, and received Senator Baucus' vote. 23 The White House did not get organized for the NAFTA fight until mid-September 1993.
Congress
Clinton planned a two-month strategy where he would slowly ratchet up his activity on behalf of NAFTA until he was "in total immersion during the last ten days." 24 Perot, calling him a demagogue and liar. Carter's chilling comments benefited the pro-NAFTA forces--it made it okay to criticize Perot in public. 26 Carter and Bush remained active in the NAFTA campaign, making phone calls and visiting House members to get them on board.
The Clinton Administration effectively employed the media to influence members of Congress. Clinton, himself, made a rare public appearance on Meet the Press and offered the claim that unions used "roughshod, muscle-bound tactics" in the NAFTA fight. 27 The
Teamster's president called on Clinton to apologize to every workingman and woman in America. The story, however, was pushed off the headlines due to the biggest drama of the season, the televised Gore-Perot NAFTA debate on CNN's Larry King Live. Gore approached
Clinton with the debate idea thinking he could beat Perot. The 9 November debate was scheduled just eight days before the vote in the House. Gore had gotten under Perot's skin and
Washington insiders scored it a knockout for Gore. The Gore victory changed the complexion of the NAFTA fight--it rendered Perot impotent and gave some people political cover who wanted to support NAFTA. 28 As the vote for NAFTA neared, the White House employed every imaginable tactic to influence undecided members of Congress, demonstrating the political process at work in 
Conclusion
President Clinton's ability to master the political process to garner support in Congress for NAFTA was a clear victory for his then struggling presidency. Eager to demonstrate a willingness to pursue a "New Democrat" agenda in the 1992 presidential race, and unwilling to back down on his campaign pledge a year later, Clinton demonstrated remarkable political savvy as he created a broad coalition across traditional interest group and party lines. The NAFTA supplemental negotiations on labor and the environment provided a striking example of how domestic politics drove international negotiations.
NAFTA's legacy was a changed political landscape in the U.S.--a different presidency, a different Congress, a different public. The NAFTA ratification process caused a lot of blood to be spilled in the Democratic Party. A former Bush aide that helped Clinton push through NAFTA said, "the real question is whether Clinton has learned that the road to a successful presidency runs through the center of Congress and the best way to win is to put together bipartisan coalitions." 32 As President Clinton flew to Seattle to attend an economic summit before the Senate vote was even complete, he was busy working the phones aboard Air Force
One. Clinton had to mend the traditional Democratic constituencies that were torn by the political process to pass NAFTA. He had Hillary's health care initiative to pass and more sausage to make!
